



**SINCLAIR**



# COALITIONAL DECOMPOSITIONS OF QUANTITIES OF INTEREST

GENERALIZED MÖBIUS INVERSION AND THE INPUT/MODEL-CENTRIC PARADIGMS

---

<sup>1</sup>EDF R&D - Lab Chatou - PRISME Department

<sup>2</sup>Institut de Mathématiques de Toulouse

<sup>3</sup>SINCLAIR AI Lab

***2023 Annual GdR MASCOT-NUM Meeting***

*Le Domaine Port aux Rocs, Le Croisic, France*

*April 3-6, 2023*

One of the PhD. goal: Theoretical characterization of what GSA (and XAI) methods **quantify** when the **inputs are not independent**.

One of the PhD. goal: Theoretical characterization of what GSA (and XAI) methods **quantify** when the **inputs are not independent**.

**Traditionally** in global sensitivity analysis (GSA), **QoI decompositions** have been shown using a **model-centric approach**.

One of the PhD. goal: Theoretical characterization of what GSA (and XAI) methods **quantify** when the **inputs are not independent**.

**Traditionally** in global sensitivity analysis (GSA), **QoI decompositions** have been shown using a **model-centric approach**.

Recently, new indices inspired by **cooperative game theory** allowed to circumvent the problem of **dependence between inputs** (Owen 2014; Herin et al. 2022).

One of the PhD. goal: Theoretical characterization of what GSA (and XAI) methods **quantify** when the **inputs are not independent**.

**Traditionally** in global sensitivity analysis (GSA), **QoI decompositions** have been shown using a **model-centric approach**.

Recently, new indices inspired by **cooperative game theory** allowed to circumvent the problem of **dependence between inputs** (Owen 2014; Herin et al. 2022).

It also allows apprehending QoI decompositions in a **new light**: the **input-centric approach**.

One of the PhD. goal: Theoretical characterization of what GSA (and XAI) methods **quantify** when the **inputs are not independent**.

**Traditionally** in global sensitivity analysis (GSA), **QoI decompositions** have been shown using a **model-centric approach**.

Recently, new indices inspired by **cooperative game theory** allowed to circumvent the problem of **dependence between inputs** (Owen 2014; Herin et al. 2022).

It also allows apprehending QoI decompositions in a **new light**: the **input-centric approach**.

Both of these approaches are linked by a combinatorial mechanism: the **Möbius inversion formula**.

One of the PhD. goal: Theoretical characterization of what GSA (and XAI) methods **quantify** when the **inputs are not independent**.

**Traditionally** in global sensitivity analysis (GSA), **QoI decompositions** have been shown using a **model-centric approach**.

Recently, new indices inspired by **cooperative game theory** allowed to circumvent the problem of **dependence between inputs** (Owen 2014; Herin et al. 2022).

It also allows apprehending QoI decompositions in a **new light**: the **input-centric approach**.

Both of these approaches are linked by a combinatorial mechanism: the **Möbius inversion formula**.

**Paving the way towards solutions for general QoI decomposition with dependent inputs.**

## What is a coalitional decomposition ?

**Definition** (Coalitional decomposition of a quantity of interest).

Let  $X = (X_1, \dots, X_d)^\top$  be random inputs, and let  $G(X)$  be a random output.

Let  $QoI(G(X))$  be a quantity of interest (QoI) on the output.

Let  $D = \{1, \dots, d\}$ , and let  $\mathcal{P}(D)$  denote the set of subsets of  $D$  (power-set).

If  $QoI(G(X))$  can be written as:

$$QoI(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi(A)$$

then the right-hand side of the equality is called a coalitional decomposition of  $QoI(G(X))$ .

**Two ways** to define coalitional decompositions: an **input-centric** approach and a **model-centric** approach.

**Let's take an example with the variance decomposition.**



## Model-centric : Sobol' indices

Let  $X_1, \dots, X_d$  be **mutually independent** inputs. Let  $G(X)$  be real-valued random variable such that  $\mathbb{V}(G(X)) < \infty$ .

## Model-centric : Sobol' indices

Let  $X_1, \dots, X_d$  be **mutually independent** inputs. Let  $G(X)$  be real-valued random variable such that  $\mathbb{V}(G(X)) < \infty$ .

From Hoeffding (1948), one has that:

$$\mathbb{L}^2(P_X) = \bigoplus_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \overline{V}_A, \quad \text{and} \quad G(X) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} G_A(X_A)$$

where the summands are **pairwise orthogonal**.

## Model-centric : Sobol' indices

Let  $X_1, \dots, X_d$  be **mutually independent** inputs. Let  $G(X)$  be real-valued random variable such that  $\mathbb{V}(G(X)) < \infty$ .

From Hoeffding (1948), one has that:

$$\mathbb{L}^2(P_X) = \bigoplus_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \overline{V}_A, \quad \text{and} \quad G(X) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} G_A(X_A)$$

where the summands are **pairwise orthogonal**.

Moreover, for any  $A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$  (Da Veiga et al. 2021):

$$\mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A]) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} \mathbb{V}(G_A(X_A))$$

which implies that (Sobol' 1990),  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ :

$$\mathbb{V}(G_A(X_A)) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_B]) = \mathbb{V}(G(X)) \times S_A,$$

and in particular ( $A = D$ ),

$$\mathbb{V}(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \mathbb{V}(G_A(X_A))$$

## Input-centric : Cooperative games for variance-based GSA

Now suppose that  $X_1, \dots, X_d$  are **not mutually independent**, and  $\mathbb{V}(G(X)) < \infty$ .

By analogy between Cooperative Game Theory and GSA, Owen (2014) proposed to view **dependent inputs** as **players**, whose value is chosen to be:

$$v(A) = \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A]).$$

## Input-centric : Cooperative games for variance-based GSA

Now suppose that  $X_1, \dots, X_d$  are **not mutually independent**, and  $\mathbb{V}(G(X)) < \infty$ .

By analogy between Cooperative Game Theory and GSA, Owen (2014) proposed to view **dependent inputs** as **players**, whose value is chosen to be:

$$v(A) = \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A]).$$

The Harsanyi (1963) dividends of this game are,  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ :

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_B]),$$

and it implies that (Bilbao 2000),  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ :

$$\mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A]) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} \psi(B),$$

## Input-centric : Cooperative games for variance-based GSA

Now suppose that  $X_1, \dots, X_d$  are **not mutually independent**, and  $\mathbb{V}(G(X)) < \infty$ .

By analogy between Cooperative Game Theory and GSA, Owen (2014) proposed to view **dependent inputs** as **players**, whose value is chosen to be:

$$v(A) = \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A]).$$

The Harsanyi (1963) dividends of this game are,  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ :

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_B]),$$

and it implies that (Bilbao 2000),  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ :

$$\mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A]) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} \psi(B),$$

and in particular ( $A = D$ ),

$$\mathbb{V}(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi(A)$$

# Input-centric and Model-centric approaches for variance decomposition

## (Traditional) Model-centric approach

$X_1, \dots, X_d$  mutually independent.

Decompose  $G(X)$  into orthogonal  $G_A(X_A)$ .

One then has  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ :

$$\mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A]) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \mathbb{V}(G_A(X_A)).$$

which implies that:

$$\mathbb{V}(G_A(X_A)) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_B])$$

## Input-centric approach

$X_1, \dots, X_d$  not necessarily mutually independent.

Chose to value  $X_A$  by  $\mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A])$ .

Set,  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ :

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_B]),$$

which implies that:

$$\mathbb{V}(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi(A)$$

# Input-centric and Model-centric approaches for variance decomposition

## (Traditional) Model-centric approach

$X_1, \dots, X_d$  mutually independent.

Decompose  $G(X)$  into orthogonal  $G_A(X_A)$ .

One then has  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ :

$$\mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A]) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \mathbb{V}(G_A(X_A)).$$

which implies that:

$$\mathbb{V}(G_A(X_A)) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_B])$$

If the inputs are **actually mutually independent**:

- $\psi(A) = \mathbb{V}(G_A(X_A))$  and both approaches are equivalent.
- The **input-centric** approach **did not require the**  $G_A(X_A)$  **to be pairwise orthogonal.**

## Input-centric approach

$X_1, \dots, X_d$  not necessarily mutually independent.

Chose to value  $X_A$  by  $\mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A])$ .

Set,  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ :

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_B]),$$

which implies that:

$$\mathbb{V}(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi(A)$$



**How are both approaches linked ?**

### How are both approaches linked ?

It is due to a **generalization of the Möbius inversion formula** to **locally finite partially ordered sets** (Rota 1964).

One of the **cornerstones** of the field of **combinatorics** (Kung, Rota, and Hung Yan 2012).

The (very general) result of Rota admits a particular form when **dealing with power-sets**.

It can be understood as a generalization of the **inclusion-exclusion principle**.

# Möbius inversion on power-sets

**Corollary** (Möbius inversion on power-sets (Rota 1964; Kung, Rota, and Hung Yan 2012)).

Let  $D = \{1, \dots, d\}$ , and any two set functions:

$$f : \mathcal{P}(D) \rightarrow \mathbb{A}, \quad g : \mathcal{P}(D) \rightarrow \mathbb{A},$$

where  $\mathbb{A}$  is an **abelian group**. Then the following equivalence holds:

$$f(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} g(B), \quad \forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D) \quad \iff \quad g(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} f(B), \quad \forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D).$$

# Möbius inversion on power-sets

**Corollary** (Möbius inversion on power-sets (Rota 1964; Kung, Rota, and Hung Yan 2012)).

Let  $D = \{1, \dots, d\}$ , and any two set functions:

$$f : \mathcal{P}(D) \rightarrow \mathbb{A}, \quad g : \mathcal{P}(D) \rightarrow \mathbb{A},$$

where  $\mathbb{A}$  is an **abelian group**. Then the following equivalence holds:

$$f(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} g(B), \quad \forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D) \quad \iff \quad g(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} f(B), \quad \forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D).$$

Three remarks:

- **Left to right:** traditional **model-centric approach**.
- **Right to left:** **Input-centric approach**.
- The set functions  $f$  and  $g$  can be valued in an **abelian group**, and not necessarily  $\mathbb{R}$ :  
**we can generalize input-centric decompositions to a broad range of Qols.**

**Examples of abelian groups:**  $\mathbb{R}$ ,  $\mathbb{R}^d$ , spaces of matrices, polynomials, vector spaces...

# Möbius inversion mechanism


The Möbius inversion is a **mechanical process**.

**Variance decomposition:** Let's compute  $\sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_B])$  with  $d = 3$ .

# Möbius inversion mechanism

The Möbius inversion is a **mechanical process**.

**Variance decomposition:** Let's compute  $\sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_B])$  with  $d = 3$ .



Powerset of  $\{1, 2, 3\}$


Let  $\mathbb{V}_A = \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A])$ .

| A   |                    |                    |                    |                    |                 |                 |                 |
|-----|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 123 | $\mathbb{V}(G(X))$ | $-\mathbb{V}_{12}$ | $-\mathbb{V}_{23}$ | $-\mathbb{V}_{13}$ | $+\mathbb{V}_1$ | $+\mathbb{V}_2$ | $+\mathbb{V}_3$ |
| 12  |                    | $+\mathbb{V}_{12}$ |                    |                    | $-\mathbb{V}_1$ | $-\mathbb{V}_2$ |                 |
| 23  |                    |                    | $+\mathbb{V}_{23}$ |                    |                 | $-\mathbb{V}_2$ | $-\mathbb{V}_3$ |
| 13  |                    |                    |                    | $+\mathbb{V}_{13}$ | $-\mathbb{V}_1$ |                 | $-\mathbb{V}_3$ |
| 1   |                    |                    |                    |                    | $+\mathbb{V}_1$ |                 |                 |
| 2   |                    |                    |                    |                    |                 | $+\mathbb{V}_2$ |                 |
| 3   |                    |                    |                    |                    |                 |                 | $+\mathbb{V}_3$ |
| Sum | $\mathbb{V}(G(X))$ | $+0$               | $+0$               | $+0$               | $+0$            | $+0$            | $+0$            |

# Möbius inversion mechanism

The Möbius inversion is a **mechanical process**.

**Variance decomposition:** Let's compute  $\sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_B])$  with  $d = 3$ .



Powerset of  $\{1, 2, 3\}$

Let  $\mathbb{V}_A = \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A])$ .

| A   |                    |                    |                    |                    |                 |                 |                 |
|-----|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 123 | $\mathbb{V}(G(X))$ | $-\mathbb{V}_{12}$ | $-\mathbb{V}_{23}$ | $-\mathbb{V}_{13}$ | $+\mathbb{V}_1$ | $+\mathbb{V}_2$ | $+\mathbb{V}_3$ |
| 12  |                    | $+\mathbb{V}_{12}$ |                    |                    | $-\mathbb{V}_1$ | $-\mathbb{V}_2$ |                 |
| 23  |                    |                    | $+\mathbb{V}_{23}$ |                    |                 | $-\mathbb{V}_2$ | $-\mathbb{V}_3$ |
| 13  |                    |                    |                    | $+\mathbb{V}_{13}$ | $-\mathbb{V}_1$ |                 | $-\mathbb{V}_3$ |
| 1   |                    |                    |                    |                    | $+\mathbb{V}_1$ |                 |                 |
| 2   |                    |                    |                    |                    |                 | $+\mathbb{V}_2$ |                 |
| 3   |                    |                    |                    |                    |                 |                 | $+\mathbb{V}_3$ |
| Sum | $\mathbb{V}(G(X))$ | +0                 | +0                 | +0                 | +0              | +0              | +0              |

This is just a fancy way to write  $\text{QoI}(G(X)) = \text{QoI}(G(X)) + 0$ .

# Meaningfulness

Many coalitional decompositions built using Möbius inversion formula **are not meaningful**.

For instance:

$$v(A) = \begin{cases} \mathbb{V}(G(X)) & \text{if } A = D, \\ c_A & \text{for any } c_A \in \mathbb{A} \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad \text{leads to a Möbius variance decomposition.}$$



# Meaningfulness

Many coalitional decompositions built using Möbius inversion formula **are not meaningful**.

For instance:

$$v(A) = \begin{cases} \mathbb{V}(G(X)) & \text{if } A = D, \\ c_A & \text{for any } c_A \in \mathbb{A} \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad \text{leads to a Möbius variance decomposition.}$$

Thus, we need to define **desirability properties** on **input-centric** coalitional decompositions.

# Meaningfulness

Many coalitional decompositions built using Möbius inversion formula **are not meaningful**.

For instance:

$$v(A) = \begin{cases} \mathbb{V}(G(X)) & \text{if } A = D, \\ c_A & \text{for any } c_A \in \mathbb{A} \text{ otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad \text{leads to a Möbius variance decomposition.}$$

Thus, we need to define **desirability properties** on **input-centric** coalitional decompositions.

**Definition** (*Gradual coalitional decomposition (I. et al. 2023)*).

Let  $X = (X_1, \dots, X_d)^\top$  be random inputs, and let  $QoI(G(X))$  be an  $\mathbb{A}$ -valued  $QoI$  on  $G$ .

For any  $A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ , let  $f_A(X_A)$  be a  $\sigma(X_A)$ -measurable **representation** of  $G(X)$ . If the coalitional decomposition can be written as:

$$QoI(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} QoI(f_B(X_B))$$

it is said to be **gradual**.

# Recipe

To build an **input-centric** gradual coalitional QoI decomposition:

- Choose **candidates**  $f_A(X_A)$  to **represent**  $G(X)$  as a function of  $X_A$ .  
(In the previous examples,  $f_A(X_A) = \mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A]$ )

# Recipe

To build an **input-centric** gradual coalitional QoI decomposition:

- Choose **candidates**  $f_A(X_A)$  to **represent**  $G(X)$  as a function of  $X_A$ .  
(In the previous examples,  $f_A(X_A) = \mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A]$ )
- Make sure that  $f_D(X) = G(X)$ .

# Recipe

To build an **input-centric** gradual coalitional QoI decomposition:

- Choose **candidates**  $f_A(X_A)$  to **represent**  $G(X)$  as a function of  $X_A$ .  
(In the previous examples,  $f_A(X_A) = \mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A]$ )
- Make sure that  $f_D(X) = G(X)$ .
- Compute the same  $\mathbb{A}$ -valued QoI on each of the  $f_A(X_A)$ , **provided they exist**.  
(e.g., a (super)-quantile, a failure probability, a covariance matrix)

# Recipe

To build an **input-centric** gradual coalitional QoI decomposition:

- Choose **candidates**  $f_A(X_A)$  to **represent**  $G(X)$  as a function of  $X_A$ .  
(In the previous examples,  $f_A(X_A) = \mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A]$ )
- Make sure that  $f_D(X) = G(X)$ .
- Compute the same  $\mathbb{A}$ -valued QoI on each of the  $f_A(X_A)$ , **provided they exist**.  
(e.g., a (super)-quantile, a failure probability, a covariance matrix)
- Compute,  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ , the quantities:

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \text{QoI}(f_B(X_B)).$$

# Recipe

To build an **input-centric** gradual coalitional QoI decomposition:

- Choose **candidates**  $f_A(X_A)$  to **represent**  $G(X)$  as a function of  $X_A$ .  
(In the previous examples,  $f_A(X_A) = \mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A]$ )
- Make sure that  $f_D(X) = G(X)$ .
- Compute the same  $\mathbb{A}$ -valued QoI on each of the  $f_A(X_A)$ , **provided they exist**.  
(e.g., a (super)-quantile, a failure probability, a covariance matrix)
- Compute,  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ , the quantities:

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \text{QoI}(f_B(X_B)).$$

- Then, by the Möbius inversion:

$$\text{QoI}(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi(A).$$

# Recipe

To build an **input-centric** gradual coalitional QoI decomposition:

- Choose **candidates**  $f_A(X_A)$  to **represent**  $G(X)$  as a function of  $X_A$ .  
(In the previous examples,  $f_A(X_A) = \mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A]$ )
- Make sure that  $f_D(X) = G(X)$ .
- Compute the same  $\mathbb{A}$ -valued QoI on each of the  $f_A(X_A)$ , **provided they exist**.  
(e.g., a (super)-quantile, a failure probability, a covariance matrix)
- Compute,  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ , the quantities:

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \text{QoI}(f_B(X_B)).$$

- Then, by the Möbius inversion:

$$\text{QoI}(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi(A).$$

**But, how can these decompositions be interpreted ?**



# Interpretation

The interpretation of each:

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \text{QoI}(f_A(X_A))$$

is **subject to the**  $f_A(X_A)$ , which are **subject to the model** and the **distribution of the inputs**.

# Interpretation

The interpretation of each:

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \text{QoI}(f_A(X_A))$$

is **subject to the**  $f_A(X_A)$ , which are **subject to the model** and the **distribution of the inputs**.

For the **variance decomposition**:

- If the inputs are **mutually independent**, and we choose  $f_A(X_A) = \mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A]$ , we saw that **both approaches are equivalent**:

$$\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D), \quad \psi(A) = \mathbb{V}(G_A(X_A)) = \mathbb{V}(G(X)) \times S_A \quad (\text{the Sobol' indices})$$

and hence the  $\psi(A)$  can be interpreted as **pure interaction effects**.

# Interpretation

The interpretation of each:

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \text{QoI}(f_A(X_A))$$

is **subject to the**  $f_A(X_A)$ , which are **subject to the model** and the **distribution of the inputs**.

For the **variance decomposition**:

- If the inputs are **mutually independent**, and we choose  $f_A(X_A) = \mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A]$ , we saw that **both approaches are equivalent**:

$$\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D), \quad \psi(A) = \mathbb{V}(G_A(X_A)) = \mathbb{V}(G(X)) \times S_A \quad (\text{the Sobol' indices})$$

and hence the  $\psi(A)$  can be interpreted as **pure interaction effects**.

- If the inputs are **not mutually independent**,  $\mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A])$  and  $\psi(A)$  can vary **according to the dependence structure**, and hence **cannot quantify pure interaction**.

## Illustration: Linear model with interaction and gaussian inputs

$$G(X) = X_1 + X_2 X_3, \quad X = \begin{pmatrix} X_1 \\ X_2 \\ X_3 \end{pmatrix} \sim \mathcal{N} \left( \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & \rho \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ \rho & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \right) \quad (1)$$

Let,  $\forall A \subseteq \{1, 2, 3\}$ :

$$\psi(A) = \frac{1}{\mathbb{V}(G(X))} \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A])$$

**Independent case** ( $\rho = 0$ )

(The  $\psi(A)$  are equal to the Sobol' indices)

$$\begin{aligned} S_1 &= 0.5 & S_2 &= 0, & S_3 &= 0, \\ S_{12} &= 0, & S_{13} &= 0, & S_{23} &= 0.5, \\ S_{123} &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

**Correlated case** ( $\rho \neq 0$ )

$$\begin{aligned} \psi(1) &= 0.5 & \psi(2) &= 0, & \psi(3) &= \rho^2/2, \\ \psi(12) &= \rho^2/2, & \psi(13) &= -\rho^2/2, & \psi(23) &= 0.5, \\ \psi(123) &= -\rho^2/2 \end{aligned}$$

## Illustration: Linear model with interaction and gaussian inputs

$$G(X) = X_1 + X_2 X_3, \quad X = \begin{pmatrix} X_1 \\ X_2 \\ X_3 \end{pmatrix} \sim \mathcal{N} \left( \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & \rho \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \\ \rho & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \right) \quad (1)$$

Let,  $\forall A \subseteq \{1, 2, 3\}$ :

$$\psi(A) = \frac{1}{\mathbb{V}(G(X))} \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A])$$

**Independent case** ( $\rho = 0$ )

(The  $\psi(A)$  are equal to the Sobol' indices)

$$\begin{aligned} S_1 &= 0.5 & S_2 &= 0, & S_3 &= 0, \\ S_{12} &= 0, & S_{13} &= 0, & S_{23} &= 0.5, \\ S_{123} &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

**Correlated case** ( $\rho \neq 0$ )

$$\begin{aligned} \psi(1) &= 0.5 & \psi(2) &= 0, & \psi(3) &= \rho^2/2, \\ \psi(12) &= \rho^2/2, & \psi(13) &= -\rho^2/2, & \psi(23) &= 0.5, \\ \psi(123) &= -\rho^2/2 \end{aligned}$$

In both cases  $\sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi(A) = 1$ , but in the **correlated case**, we cannot precisely characterize what  $\psi(A)$  quantifies.

## Shapley effects with dependent inputs

Hence, the precise interpretation of

$$\psi(A) = \frac{1}{\mathbb{V}(G(X))} \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A])$$

is still an open question : it clearly is a mixture of interaction and dependence effects.

But which mixture ?

## Shapley effects with dependent inputs

Hence, the precise interpretation of

$$\psi(A) = \frac{1}{\mathbb{V}(G(X))} \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) \mid X_A])$$

is still an open question : it clearly is a mixture of interaction and dependence effects.

But which mixture ?

The **Shapley effects** for an input  $i \in D$  can be written as (Harsanyi 1963):

$$\text{Sh}_i = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D), i \in A} \frac{\psi(A)}{|A|}.$$

which is an **egalitarian aggregation of a (not so clear) mixture of interaction and dependence effects.**

## Shapley effects with dependent inputs

Hence, the precise interpretation of

$$\psi(A) = \frac{1}{\mathbb{V}(G(X))} \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A])$$

is still an open question : it clearly is a mixture of interaction and dependence effects.

But which mixture ?

The **Shapley effects** for an input  $i \in D$  can be written as (Harsanyi 1963):

$$\text{Sh}_i = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D), i \in A} \frac{\psi(A)}{|A|}.$$

which is an **egalitarian aggregation** of a (not so clear) mixture of interaction and dependence effects.

**Choosing  $v(A) = \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A])$ , leads to an uncharacterized quantification.**



## Coalitional decompositions of QoIs:

- We saw two approaches: **Input-centric** and **Model-centric**.
- Defining **input-centric gradual** QoI decomposition **reduces to the choice of a representant**  $f_A(X_A)$ .
- The **input-centric** approach **bypasses the need** for **input independence** and, in the case of  $\mathbb{L}^2$ , an **orthogonal functional decomposition**.
- The interpretation of these decompositions **vary w.r.t. the dependence structure and the choice of representant**.

# Conclusions

## Coalitional decompositions of QoIs:

- We saw two approaches: **Input-centric** and **Model-centric**.
- Defining **input-centric gradual** QoI decomposition **reduces to the choice of a representant**  $f_A(X_A)$ .
- The **input-centric** approach **bypasses the need** for **input independence** and, in the case of  $\mathbb{L}^2$ , an **orthogonal functional decomposition**.
- The interpretation of these decompositions **vary w.r.t. the dependence structure and the choice of representant**.

## Cooperative games based GSA indices:

- Allocations are aggregations of **input-centric** coalitional QoI decompositions, driven by the choice of value function  $v(A)$ .
- The Shapley effects (for dependent inputs) are an **egalitarian redistribution** of the gradual QoI decomposition with  $v(A) = \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A])$ .
- **At this time, we cannot characterize exactly what they quantify.**

**But...**

But...

For **(not necessarily mutually independent)** inputs  $X = (X_1, \dots, X_d)^\top$ , is it possible to **find representants**  $f_A(X_A)$  such that each term

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(f_B(X_B))$$

of the **input-centric gradual variance decomposition**

$$\mathbb{V}(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi(A)$$

quantifies pure interaction ?

But...

For **(not necessarily mutually independent)** inputs  $X = (X_1, \dots, X_d)^\top$ , is it possible to find **representants**  $f_A(X_A)$  such that each term

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \mathbb{V}(f_A(X_A))$$

of the **input-centric** gradual variance decomposition

$$\mathbb{V}(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi(A)$$

quantifies pure interaction ?

Our intuition:

- **Model-centric** approach to find the representants  $f_A(X_A)$ .
- **Input-centric** approach to define a gradual variance decomposition using these representants.

## Perspective

In the case of models in  $\mathbb{L}^2$ , the **model-centric** approach would amount to show that:

$$\mathbb{L}^2(P_X) = \bigoplus_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \overline{V_A},$$

hold whenever the inputs are **not necessarily mutually independent**, where the  $\overline{V_A}$  are **not necessarily pairwise orthogonal**.

In the case of models in  $\mathbb{L}^2$ , the **model-centric** approach would amount to show that:

$$\mathbb{L}^2(P_X) = \bigoplus_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \overline{V}_A,$$

hold whenever the inputs are **not necessarily mutually independent**, where the  $\overline{V}_A$  are **not necessarily pairwise orthogonal**.

If so, the **projections** of  $G(X)$  onto each  $\overline{V}_A$  could allow to define **promising representants**.

For fixed marginals and a fixed model, there would be **one set of representants for a particular dependence structure**.

In the case of models in  $\mathbb{L}^2$ , the **model-centric** approach would amount to show that:

$$\mathbb{L}^2(P_X) = \bigoplus_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \overline{V}_A,$$

hold whenever the inputs are **not necessarily mutually independent**, where the  $\overline{V}_A$  are **not necessarily pairwise orthogonal**.

If so, the **projections** of  $G(X)$  onto each  $\overline{V}_A$  could allow to define **promising representants**.

For fixed marginals and a fixed model, there would be **one set of representants for a particular dependence structure**.

**What would be the properties of gradual variance decompositions with this choice of representants ?**



In the case of models in  $\mathbb{L}^2$ , the **model-centric** approach would amount to show that:

$$\mathbb{L}^2(P_X) = \bigoplus_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \overline{V}_A,$$

hold whenever the inputs are **not necessarily mutually independent**, where the  $\overline{V}_A$  are **not necessarily pairwise orthogonal**.

If so, the **projections** of  $G(X)$  onto each  $\overline{V}_A$  could allow to define **promising representants**.

For fixed marginals and a fixed model, there would be **one set of representants for a particular dependence structure**.

**What would be the properties of gradual variance decompositions with this choice of representants ?**

We don't know yet... But we're working on it :)

# Coalitional decompositions of parameters of interest

For a more in-depth (and more general) study of the **relationship** between **Möbius inversion** and **coalitional decompositions** of Qols, check-out our **pre-print** (HAL/arXiv):

## On the coalitional decomposition of parameters of interest

Marouane El Idrissi<sup>a,b,c,e</sup>, Nicolas Bousquet<sup>a,b,d</sup>, Fabrice Gamboa<sup>c</sup>, Bertrand Iooss<sup>a,b,c</sup>, Jean-Michel Loubes<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup>*EDF Lab Chatou, 6 Quai Watier, 78401 Chatou, France*

<sup>b</sup>*SINCLAIR AI Lab., Saclay, France*

<sup>c</sup>*Institut de Mathématiques de Toulouse, 31062 Toulouse, France*

<sup>d</sup>*Sorbonne Université, LPSM, 4 place Jussieu, Paris, France*

# References i

- Bilbao, J. M. 2000. *Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures* [in en]. Edited by W. Leinfellner and G. Eberlein. Vol. 26. Theory and Decision Library. Boston, MA: Springer US. isbn: 978-1-4613-6976-9 978-1-4615-4393-0.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4393-0>. <http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-1-4615-4393-0>.
- Da Veiga, S., F. Gamboa, B. Iloos, and C. Prieur. 2021. *Basics and Trends in Sensitivity Analysis: Theory and Practice in R* [in en]. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial / Applied Mathematics, January. isbn: 978-1-61197-668-7 978-1-61197-669-4.  
<https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611976694>. <https://epubs.siam.org/doi/book/10.1137/1.9781611976694>.
- Gamboa, F., A. Janon, T. Klein, and A. Lagnoux. 2013. "Sensitivity indices for multivariate outputs." *Comptes Rendus Mathematique* 351 (7): 307–310. issn: 1631-073X. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.crma.2013.04.016>.
- Harsanyi, J. C. 1963. "A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game." Publisher: [Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania, Wiley, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University], *International Economic Review* 4 (2): 194–220. issn: 0020-6598. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2525487>. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2525487>.
- Herin, M., M. I., V. Chabridon, and B. Iloos. 2022. *Proportional marginal effects for global sensitivity analysis* [in en], October.  
<https://hal.science/hal-03825935>.
- Hoeffding, W. 1948. "A Class of Statistics with Asymptotically Normal Distribution." Publisher: Institute of Mathematical Statistics, *The Annals of Mathematical Statistics* 19, no. 3 (September): 293–325. issn: 0003-4851, 2168-8990.  
<https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177730196>.  
<https://projecteuclid.org/journals/annals-of-mathematical-statistics/volume-19/issue-3/A-Class-of-Statistics-with-Asymptotically-Normal-Distribution/10.1214/aoms/1177730196.full>.

- I., M., N. Bousquet, F. Gamboa, B. Iooss, and J. Loubes. 2023. *On the coalitional decomposition of parameters of interest* [in en], January. Accessed April 2, 2023. <https://hal.science/hal-03927476>.
- Kung, J. P. S., G-C. Rota, and C. Hung Yan. 2012. *Combinatorics: the Rota way*. OCLC: 1226672593. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-0-511-80389-5.
- Owen, Art B. 2014. "Sobol' Indices and Shapley Value" [in en]. *SIAM/ASA Journal on Uncertainty Quantification* 2, no. 1 (January): 245–251. ISSN: 2166-2525. <https://doi.org/10.1137/130936233>. <http://epubs.siam.org/doi/10.1137/130936233>.
- Rota, G-C. 1964. "On the foundations of combinatorial theory I. Theory of Möbius Functions." *Zeitschrift für Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie und Verwandte Gebiete* 2 (4): 340–368. ISSN: 1432-2064. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00531932>.
- Sobol', I M. 1990. "On sensitivity estimation for nonlinear mathematical models" [in Russian]. *Mathematical Modelling and Computational Experiments* 2 (1): 112–118.

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!**

**ANY QUESTIONS?**

# Cooperative game theory

In a nutshell, cooperative game theory can be summarized as “**the art of cutting a cake**”.



Given a **set of players**  $D = \{1, \dots, d\}$ , who produces a **quantity**  $v(D)$ , how can one allocate shares of  $v(D)$  among the  $d$  players?

The “**cake cutting process**” is often described through **axioms** (i.e., desired properties), and results in an **allocation**.


Formally, a cooperative game is denoted  $(D, v)$  where  $D$  is a **set of players**, and  $v : \mathcal{P}(D) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  is a **value function**, mapping every possible subset of players to a real value.

## Interpreting the Shapley values: Harsanyi dividends

Another equivalent enlightening representation of the Shapley values can be done using **Harsanyi dividends** (Harsanyi 1963).

Let  $(D, v)$  be a cooperative game, and for any  $A \subseteq D$ , let the **Harsanyi dividend** of the coalition  $A$  be:

$$D_v(A) = \sum_{B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} v(B).$$



The Harsanyi dividends can be interpreted as the **surplus (or shortfall)** that a coalition generates:

$$D_v(1) = v(1), \quad D_v(2) = v(2),$$


$$D_v(1, 2) = v(1, 2) - v(1) - v(2).$$

## Interpreting the Shapley values: Harsanyi dividends

The Shapley values are then defined as:

$$Sh_i = \sum_{A \subseteq D: i \in A} \frac{D_v(A)}{|A|},$$

or, in other words, each dividend of a coalition is **equally** redistributed between the players that composes it.



Quick example: Eve and John are two developers, Eve produces 10.000 lines of code, John produces 8.000 lines of code.

However, John really likes to play babyfoot, but Eve is a hard-worker.

When working together, they only produce 10.000 lines of code. This means that the dividend of their coalition is  $-8.000$ .

**Is it fair to attribute Eve  $-4.000$  lines of code, even if she did all the work ?**



## Example - Covariance Matrix decomposition

Suppose that  $G(X) = (G_1(X), \dots, G_k(X))^T$  is valued in  $\mathbb{R}^k$ , and that  $G(X) \in \mathbb{L}^2(P_X, \mathbb{R}^k)$  (Gamboa et al. 2013).

The QoI is the covariance matrix of the outputs  $\mathbb{V}(G(X)) \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}$ .

Let  $\Sigma(A) = \mathbb{V}(\mathbb{E}[G(X) | X_A]) \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}$  be defined element-wise as:

$$\Sigma_{i,j}(A) = \text{Cov}(\mathbb{E}[G_i(X) | X_A], \mathbb{E}[G_j(X) | X_A]).$$

Let,  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ :

$$\psi(A) = \sum_{B \in \mathcal{P}(A)} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \Sigma(B) \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}.$$

Then, using the Möbius inversion on power-sets, one has the following coalitional decomposition of the output covariance matrix:

$$\mathbb{V}(G(X)) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi(A).$$

# Posets, incidence algebra and Möbius inverse

A *partially ordered set* (poset) is defined as a pair  $(S, \leq)$  where  $S$  is a non-empty set, and  $\leq$  is a partial order binary relation on elements of  $S$ . A poset  $(S, \leq)$  is said to be *locally finite* if, for any  $x, z \in S$ , the sets  $\{y \in S : x \leq y \leq z\}$  (also called *segments* of  $S$ ) are finite.

Denote  $I_{\mathbb{A}}(S)$  the incidence algebra of a locally finite poset  $(S, \leq)$  over a commutative ring with identity  $\mathbb{A}$ , i.e., the set of functions  $f : S \times S \rightarrow \mathbb{A}$  such that  $f(x, y) = 0$  if  $x \not\leq y$ .  $(I_{\mathbb{A}}(S), +, *)$  forms an  $\mathbb{A}$ -algebra with the usual pointwise addition  $+$  and the usual convolution  $*$ , i.e., for any  $f, g \in I_{\mathbb{A}}(S)$ , and any  $x, z \in S$  such that the segment  $\{y \in S : x \leq y \leq z\}$  is non-empty,

$$(f * g)(x, z) = \sum_{x \leq y \leq z} f(x, y)g(y, z).$$

The zeta function  $\zeta \in I_{\mathbb{A}}(S)$  is the convolutional identity of the incidence algebra, and is defined as,  $\forall x, y \in S$ :

$$\zeta(x, y) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = y, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

# Posets, incidence algebra and Möbius inverse

The Möbius function, denoted  $\mu \in I_{\mathbb{A}}(\mathcal{S})$ , in the case of locally finite posets  $\mathcal{S}$ , is defined as the *inverse of the zeta function for the convolution operator* defined on the incidence algebra of  $\mathcal{S}$ , and can be computed recursively, for any  $x, y \in \mathcal{S}$  with  $x \leq y$ , as

$$\mu(x, y) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = y \\ - \sum_{x \leq z < y} \mu(x, z) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

**Theorem** (*Möbius inversion formula on locally finite posets*). Let  $\mathcal{S}$  be any non-empty set and  $(\mathcal{S}, \leq)$  form a locally finite poset, where  $\leq$  is a binary relation. Let  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  be functions from  $\mathcal{S}$  to  $\mathbb{A}$ . Then, the following equivalence hold:

$$\varphi(x) = \sum_{y: y \leq x} \psi(y), \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{S} \quad \iff \quad \psi(x) = \sum_{y: y \leq x} \varphi(y) \mu(y, x), \quad \forall x \in \mathcal{S}.$$

where  $\mu$  is the Möbius function.

# Posets, incidence algebra and Möbius inverse

**Definition** (*Quantity of interest*). An  $\mathbb{A}$ -valued Qol on a model  $G$  with random inputs  $X \sim P_X$ , is an application:

$$\begin{aligned}\phi : \mathbb{P}(E) \times \mathcal{M}(E) &\rightarrow \mathbb{A} \\ P \times H &\mapsto \phi_P(H).\end{aligned}$$

onto  $G$  and  $P_X$ , i.e.,  $\phi_{P_X}(G)$ .

**Lemma** (*Möbius decomposition*). Let  $G \in \mathcal{M}$  a model with  $E$ -valued random inputs  $X \sim P_X \in \mathbb{P}(E)$ . Let  $\phi_{P_X}(G)$  be a Qol on  $G$ . Let  $\varphi : \mathcal{P}(D) \rightarrow \mathbb{A}$  be a set function such that:

$$\varphi_D = \phi_{P_X}(G).$$

and  $\forall A \in \mathcal{P}(D)$ ,  $\varphi_A$  is well-defined. Then,  $\phi_{P_X}(G)$  admits the following coalitional decomposition:

$$\phi_{P_X}(G) = \sum_{A \in \mathcal{P}(D)} \psi_A,$$

where,  $\forall A \subseteq D$ ,  $\psi_A = \sum_{B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A|-|B|} \varphi_B$ .